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The term ‘illiberal democracy’, coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997, has gained much traction, 
specifically since its use by Hungarian Prime Minster Victor Orbán in 2014. Ever since, Orbán 
and his governing party Fidesz have been implementing this vision resulting in major cutdowns 
on free speech, freedom of press, of various NGOs which support human rights, and so forth. 
Moreover, Fidesz won the 2018 national election with a strong focus on anti-immigration 
policies. Although Orbán’s restrictive migration policies were widely criticised during the 
so-called refugee crisis 2015, many EU member states have started to follow the Hungarian 
policy of closing borders and protecting the EU from asylum-seekers and an alleged invasion 
by Muslims. I claim that formerly taboo subjects and expressions in mainstream discourse are 
being accepted more and more (‘normalisation’). Such normalisation goes hand in hand with 
a certain ‘shamelessness’: the limits of the sayable are shifting regarding both the frequency 
of lies and the violating of discourse conventions – as well as regarding repeated attacks on 
central democratic institutions. Normalising the assessment of migrants as a threat to inner 
security and a burden on the welfare state and education system must be perceived as an 
international development – generally instrumentalising a ‘politics of fear’. {have trimmed 
this – please check}
Key words ??????
To cite this article: Wodak, R. (2019) Entering the ‘post-shame era’: the rise of illiberal 
democracy, populism and neo-authoritarianism in EUrope, Global Discourse, vol 9, no 1, 
xx-xx, DOI: 10.1332/xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Introduction
On 17 July 2018, former US president Barack Obama was invited to give the Nelson 




















































a politics of fear and resentment and retrenchment began to appear, and that 
kind of politics is now on the move … I am not being alarmist, I am simply 
stating the facts. … Strongman politics are ascendant suddenly, whereby 
elections and some pretence of democracy are maintained – the form of 
it – but those in power seek to undermine every institution or norm that 
gives democracy meaning.1
Obviously, Obama did not use the terms ‘illiberal democracy’, ‘neo-authoritarianism’ 
or ‘populism’ (or other terms which currently dominate social-science scholarship and 
media reporting), but he certainly put his finger on the drastic socio-political changes 
that have been taking place globally, including in EU member states, specifically 
since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 (Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018 {a or b? 
or Wodak and Rheindorf 2018?}).
Indeed, as a study on ‘Fear not values’ conducted by de Vries and Hoffman (2016) 
in eight EU member states2 illustrates, over 50% of the voters for far-right parties 
viewed globalisation as the major threat in the future.3 Moreover, 53% of those who 
fear globalisation perceive migration as the major global challenge, and 54% display 
anti-foreigner sentiments. In a similar vein, political scientist Ivan Krastev concludes 
in his widely acknowledged essay Europadämmerung (2017, 48–49) that the ‘refugee 
crisis’ of 2015 might eventually lead to the destruction of the EU.
Although many politicians at EU and national levels, as well as other prominent 
public intellectuals, are explicitly warning against the European and global drift 
towards more (ethno-)nationalism, illiberal democracies and authoritarianism – and 
thus against violations of human rights, international treaties and EU norms and values 
(for example, Otmar Karas,4 Emanuel Macron,5 and Jürgen Habermas6) – official 
responses on the part of the EU have been slow and follow complex, institutionally 
defined procedures (Article 7 of the European Treaty).7 Along these lines, Grabbe 
and Lehne (2017b: 8) state that:
EU actors must therefore explain why they have to protect core EU 
standards and make it clear that steps will be taken against any government 
that undermines EU law. Strong statements from other Central European 
governments would be particularly helpful. The EU can also counter claims 
of double standards by getting tougher on bad behaviour by member states 
across the board, particularly on corruption and misuse of public funds.
Due to space restrictions, I will have to neglect the institutional struggles on the EU 
level and the various attempts to negotiate with Hungary and Poland, but those have 
been covered extensively by Uitz (2015), Kerski (2018), and Möllers and Schneider 
(2018). Uitz (2015: 293–295) also provides compelling evidence for the impossibility 
of drawing on the agreed-upon conventions of dialoguing, negotiating and compromising, 
if one of the partners in these interactions does not want to comply with the established 
rules of such language games (Wodak, 2015a, 2017): this precludes that there is no 
‘productive dialogue’ ({Wodak, 2015a or 2017?} p 294). The Hungarian and Polish 
governments seem convinced that these conventions do not apply to them and are 
driven ‘by the urge to establish exceptions, in the spirit of constitutional parochialism’ 
({Wodak, 2015a or 2017?} p 296). In other words, context-dependent discursive 
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and eristic argumentation dominate official communication, accompanied by ever-
more nationalism, chauvinism and nativism.
In this vein, I claim that this kind of rejection of dialogue relates to a ‘post-shame era’ 
rather than, as many scholars believe, merely to a ‘post-truth era’ (for example, Scheff, 
2000; Hahl et al, 2018): anti-elitist and anti-pluralist/exclusionary rhetoric, symbolic 
politics (such as focusing on the ‘headscarves’ of Muslim women while neglecting 
complex socioeconomic issues associated with migration and integration), ‘digital 
demagogy’, ‘bad manners’ and ‘anti-politics’ support the non-complying behaviours 
of powerful politicians that frequently resonate as ‘authentic’ with the core followers 
of these politicians, their parties or governments. Instead of discussing and providing 
solutions for major socio-political problems such as globally rising inequality and 
youth unemployment, and the consequences of climate change for migration politics, 
refugees and migrants serve as the scapegoat and simplistic explanation for all woes. 
Against this background, ‘anti-politics’ is defined as a specific attitude and related 
discourse which systematically undermine democratic institutions (Diehl, 2017: 
28–29). The state itself, the entire political system, is challenged, like in reality TV: 
shamelessness, humiliation of other participants, defamation, lies and ad hominem 
attacks dominate. Indeed, such shameless behaviour could be observed, for example, 
in several TV debates during the presidential election campaign in Austria in 2016, 
employed by the far-right populist candidate (for the Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), 
Norbert Hofer (Wodak, 2017). Mastropaolo (2000: 36) mentions similar patterns 
of scandalisation, ‘politicotainment’ and the decay of democratic procedures in Italian 
politics in the 1990s (Wodak, 2011).
In this paper, I trace the trajectory of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) in its 
transformation into the ‘New People’s Party’ under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, 
recently entering a coalition government with the populist extreme-right FPÖ. This 
allows me to identify the many small and large changes that Austria has undergone on 
the way from a constitutional liberal democracy since 1945 to a potentially Orbánesque 
illiberal democracy, thus indicating some limits of the liberal democratic European 
project envisioned by the founding fathers. This, I argue, must be recognised as a 
process of ‘normalisation’ – the normalisation of far-right ideologies in both content 
and form. This process can also be observed in the Netherlands, where Geert Wilders’ 
Party for Freedom (PVV) has exerted much influence on the mainstream, labelled the 
‘Geert Wilders-effect’.8 Thus, specific patterns and stages of the Austrian trajectory 
can most probably be generalised to other EU member states. In this context, I will 
also discuss some constitutive discursive strategies of the post-shame era, the adaptation 
and integration of illiberalism and authoritarianism into formerly liberal democratic 
regimes. First, however, I shall briefly define the relevant concepts mentioned above 
and necessarily restrict myself to briefly elaborating on ‘populism’, ‘authoritarianism/
neo-authoritarianism’ and ‘illiberal democracy/managed democracy’.
Defining relevant concepts
Populism
There is no consensus as to whether ‘far-right populism/populist right-wing 
extremism’ is an ideology (thin or thick; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015: 5), a philosophy 




















































option for right-wing extremists like the strategies used by the Nazi Party in the 
1930s and 1940s (Salzborn, 2018) or a specific political style (Moffitt, 2017; Brubaker, 
2017: 3) that manifests mainly in performance and communication.
In their frequently cited approach, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 9–12) emphasise 
three parameters of populism: first, the opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the 
corrupt elite’; second, a grounding in the volonté générale of the people; third, its 
character as a thin ideology, because it does not constitute a coherent structure of 
beliefs but assembles contradictory ideologemes in an eclectic fashion. As Mudde 
and Kaltwasser do not restrict their definition to the populist far right, the notion of 
‘the people’ refers to the people as both sovereign (demos) and the common people. 
Moreover, it can refer to the people as ethnos. Furthermore, the notion of ‘the elite’ is 
differentiated into elites with (cultural, economic or social) power and elites defined 
on purely ethnic grounds. Finally, the volonté générale is equated with the general will 
of the people in the sense of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
This rather general definition must be specified – four dimensions are crucial in the 
context of recent political developments in the EU (Wodak, 2015a: 20–22, 25–33):
• Nationalism/Nativism/Anti-pluralism: Far-right populist parties stipulate a 
seemingly homogenous ethnos, a populum or Volk, which can be arbitrarily defined – 
often in nativist (blood-related) terms. Such parties value the homeland or Heimat, 
which seems to require protection from dangerous invaders. In this way, threat 
scenarios are constructed – the homeland or the ‘we’ is threatened by ‘others’: 
strangers within and/or outside society.
• Anti-elitism: Such parties share an anti-elitist and anti-intellectual attitude 
(‘arrogance of ignorance’; Wodak, 2015a) related to strong EU scepticism. According 
to these parties, democracy should essentially be reduced to the majoritarian 
principle, that is, the rule of the (arbitrarily defined) ‘true people’.
• Authoritarianism: A saviour, a charismatic leader is worshipped, alternating between 
the roles of Robin Hood (protecting the welfare state, supporting the ‘simple 
folk’) and the ‘strict father’ (Lakoff, 2004 {Not in References}). Such charismatic 
leaders require a hierarchically structured party and government to guarantee 
‘law and order’ and ‘security’.
• Conservativism/Historical revisionism: Far-right populist parties usually represent 
conservative values (emphasising family values) and insist on preserving the status 
quo or a return to former, ‘better’ times. The aim of protecting the homeland also 
builds on a shared narrative of the past in which ‘we’ are either heroes or victims 
of evil (a conspiracy, enemies of the fatherland, and so on). This transforms past 
suffering or defeat into stories of the successes of the people or into stories 
of betrayal and treachery by others. Social welfare, in the concomitant welfare 
chauvinism, should only be given to ‘true’ members of the ethnos.
Although not all far-right populist parties endorse all of the above, these – realised 
in specific combinations – can be generalised as typical ideologies of the far right. In 
all cases, such parties will advocate change, moving away from an allegedly dangerous 
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Illiberal democracy
The distinction between ‘liberal/constitutional democracies’ and ‘illiberal democracies’ 
is not new. The salient criterion for the existence of a liberal democracy is 
constitutionalism in the sense of checks and balances designed to protect the state 
and its society from the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. According 
to Zakaria (1997: 23–24), who coined the term, illiberal democracies are increasing 
around the world and are increasingly limiting the freedoms of the people they 
represent (such as civil liberties of speech or religion). Nevertheless, the term ‘illiberal 
democracy’ remains a contested concept (see Krastev, 2006).
Since its public use in 2014 by Hungarian Prime Minster Victor Orbán, leader of 
the far-right/nationalistic-conservative party Fidesz, ‘illiberal democracy’ has entered 
everyday discourse in Europe and has been appropriated by some politicians as a 
positive model to be followed; and as a political system to be vehemently opposed 
by others. In his speech on 30 July 2014, Orbán maintained that:
the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-
liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such 
as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology 
the central element of state organization, but instead includes a different, 
special, national approach.9
Here, Orbán defines ‘illiberal democracy’ as rejecting tolerance for minorities while 
supporting strong forms of majoritarianism. He emphasises his belief in nationalism 
(Hungary’s uniqueness vis-à-vis the EU and the other 27 EU member states) and 
exceptionalism. The Hungarian Constitution, which was revised and accepted by 
the Hungarian Parliament on 25 April 2011, reflects Fidesz’s illiberal values by, for 
example, cutting the freedom of the press, reforming the electoral system in unfair 
ways, and challenging and undermining the independence of justice (Uitz, 2015: 
285–288; Grabbe and Lehne, 2017a). In Poland, similar developments are taking 
place under the nationalistic-conservative government of the Law and Justice Party 
(PiS) and its leader Jarosław Kaczyński (Grabbe and Lehne, 2017b; Kerski, 2018). 
Of course, gerrymandering and using the resources of the state on a very large scale 
to ensure a sweeping full-majority victory would not necessarily imply fraudulent 
elections in a formal sense, but the boundaries of legality are shamelessly pushed as 
far as possible (Uitz, 2015).10 Indeed, Sutowski (2018: 17–18) labels the new Polish 
way as ‘neo-authoritarianism’.
Thus, liberal democracies cannot be defined solely by the fact that elections are 
formally held; as Möllers and Schneider (2018: 7–9) maintain, the protection of 
oppositional parties and movements, freedom of opinion and the press, fair elections 
and independence of the judicial system must be guaranteed. Therefore, the authors 
argue that potential future majorities must be protected: the opposition must retain the 
institutional opportunities to win majorities in a future election (pp 89–90). This 






















































Fuchs (2018: 56–58) defines right-wing/neo-authoritarianism by drawing on the 
traditions of the Frankfurt School (specifically Franz Neumann and T.W. Adorno) 
along four similar dimensions, namely: Nationalism, Friend/Enemy-Scheme, Authoritarian 
Leadership and Patriarchy and Militarism. Two elements stand out in Fuchs’ conceptual 
framework: political fetishism of the nation ‘to deflect attention from class contradictions 
and power inequalities’; moreover, ‘leader fetishism is used as a political organization 
principle that often extends to the organization of the capitalist economy, culture 
and everyday life’ (p 56). Secondly, Fuchs emphasises the glorification of the soldier and 
warrior; indeed violence, imperialism and war are accepted ‘as appropriate ways for 
organizing social relations’ (p 57). Fuchs’ neo-Marxist framework allows understanding 
the link between the neoliberal world order and the rise of illiberal democracies as 
well as neo-authoritarian regimes.
Mudde (2007: 22) also draws on the Frankfurt School but subscribes to a more 
socio-psychological tradition: authoritarianism is defined as ‘a general disposition to 
glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical towards authoritative figures of the 
ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some 
moral authority’ (Adorno et al, 1969: 228, emphasis added). However, Mudde also 
points to Juan Linz’s influential definition of authoritarianism as a form of government 
characterised by strong central power and limited individual freedoms. Following 
Linz (1964), four dimensions are emphasised as salient elements of an authoritarian 
government:
• limited political pluralism places constraints on political parties, interest groups and 
NGOs;
• legitimacy is largely dependent on emotions, on identification with the regime;
• suppression of the opposition; and,
• vague and non-transparent definitions of the powers of the executive.11
Obviously, these criteria overlap with the definitions of illiberal democracy mentioned 
above.
Furthermore, Levitsky and Way (2002) point to another relevant concept: 
‘competitive authoritarianism’, which differs from so-called ‘façade’ electoral regimes (also 
labelled ‘pseudo-democracies’, ‘virtual democracies’ and ‘electoral authoritarian’), that 
is regimes in which electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation 
of power (such as Egypt, Singapore and Uzbekistan in the 1990s). Competitive 
authoritarianism implies regimes that are democratic in appearance but authoritarian 
in nature; thus, democratic institutions exist in form but not in substance, because the 
electoral, legislative, judicial, media and other institutions are so heavily skewed in 
favour of current power holders. Russia under President Vladimir Putin, the authors 
claim, would fall within the category of competitive authoritarianism.12 In a detailed 
comparative study of media systems, Becker (2004: 149) regards the Russian press 
under Putin as a neo-authoritarian media system. He argues that ‘state-owned media 
have limited autonomy, and appointments to key positions are linked to political 
loyalty. Access to the media may be open and private ownership may be tolerated, 
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applied to suppress freedom of opinion. The regime also uses or tolerates violence 
against opposition journalists and editors. In this way, self-censorship is reinforced.
As will be elaborated later, the Austrian government coalition between ÖVP and 
FPÖ has placed severe controls on information and is attempting to intervene in 
the public state-owned media; this could certainly be regarded as a significant step 
in the direction of an illiberal democracy and a neo-authoritarian media system. 
Such developments clearly point to the limit of EUrope as envisioned and indeed as 
stipulated, for example, in the European Treaty of Lisbon 2008–09.13
The turquoise-blue government in Austria, 2017–18
Looking back: the rise of the FPÖ
The Austrian ‘Freedom Party’ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) must be distinguished 
from other populist far-right parties in terms of its history and continuous ties to 
National Socialism, as well as its fascist, racist, antisemitic and white-supremacist 
ideology.14 Today, one might consider labelling the party as populist extreme-right, 
owing to some of its ideological characteristics, as well as its leading members who 
belong to German-national duelling fraternities (see below).15
After Heinz-Christian (HC) Strache took control of the FPÖ in 2005, frontstage 
activities of the party saw a softening of extreme-right positions and an increase in 
the salient mobilisation of symbols of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995):16 displaying 
the Austrian flag, singing the national anthem and displaying an abundance of other 
symbols of national pride. In many instances, the respective texts and performances 
feature Strache himself wielding these symbols (see Figure 1), portraying the FPÖ 
politicians as brave, strong and skilled mountaineers who have climbed to the very 
mountain top, and subsequently addressing their role as the saviours of ‘true Austrians’.
<insert Figure 1>  Is it possible to supply the images as separate files please?
Figure 1. Harald Vilimsky (Party Secretary and MEP, Europe of Nations and Freedom 
Party), HC Strache, Johann Gudenus (Deputy-Mayor of Vienna; since 2018, MP and 
FPÖ whip) and Herbert Kickl (Party Secretary; since 2018, Minister for Interior Affairs) 
brandishing the Austrian flag at the Großglockner peak, Austria’s highest mountain 
(Strache, 2017) {is this the source? Do we have permissions to use? Not in References – 




















































With Strache’s leadership came a re-branding of the FPÖ as the ‘Soziale 
Heimatpartei’, the Social Homeland Party (a label it shares with the extreme-right 
National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD). Further provocations relate to the 
use of religious imagery and symbols (for example, Strache carried a Christian cross 
during a demonstration against the building of a Mosque in Vienna; Wodak, 2015a: 
140), as well as the redefining of religious concepts, such as Nächstenliebe (neighbourly 
love or charity) in nationalistic terms. The accompanying claims to represent and 
‘defend’ the Christian heritage of Austria in the face of an alleged ‘Islamic invasion’ 
have been protested, inter alia, by the Catholic Church. Indeed, the FPÖ’s ‘othering’ 
has come to focus strongly on Islam, cast as an ethnic other, medieval/pre-modern/
barbaric and religious zealot/ fanatic or terrorist threat (Wodak, 2017: 116–137; 
Wodak and Rheindorf, 2018).
2017 parliamentary elections
The Austrian parliamentary elections on 15 October 2017 exemplify the shameless 
normalisation of the previously far-right positionings of the FPÖ. The ÖVP (now 
rebranded as ‘Ballot Sebastian Kurz – The New People’s Party’, strategically changing 
colour from black to turquoise) focused almost exclusively on migration issues 
(equating all refugees with so-called ‘illegal migrants’17). This new programme 
changed the agenda and structure of the ÖVP,18 which had been established 
immediately after the restoration of Austria’s independence in 1945 and has been 
represented in parliament ever since. The ÖVP has consistently been the strongest 
or second-strongest party; as such, it has led or at least been a partner in most of 
Austria’s governments (Grande et al, 2012: 52). Sebastian Kurz, who had strategically 
prepared to take over the ÖVP since mid-2016 (as was disclosed by newspapers 
in June 201719), was elected as party leader on 1 July 2017, after his predecessor 
had resigned, and immediately changed the structure of the ‘grand old party’: he 
surrounded himself with an extremely loyal team of mostly young male supporters 
and with politically inexperienced career-changers who are completely dependent 
on him. He employs a large team of spin doctors who cleverly manage his online 
presence and his campaign, apparently copying many elements of US election rallies 
(see Horaczek and Tóth, 2017; Hofer and Tóth, 2017). In this way, the party has 
become identified with his persona to the point where Kurz is the new ÖVP with 
a strict centralised, hierarchical structure.
Apart from proposing to dismantle the social partnership (and thus one of the 
constitutive cornerstones of the Austrian social model) and support employers’ 
organisations,20 the new ÖVP repeatedly promised to close the ‘Mediterranean route’ 
to migration; to reduce the legally fixed minimum welfare (for recognised refugees 
but also for other people in need); moreover, to reduce the upper limit for asylum 
applicants, in effect since 2016, from 37,000 to zero (although the number of new 
arrivals since 2015 has decreased dramatically).21 In so doing, Kurz adopted almost 
verbatim the programme of the FPÖ. It is thus fitting that the Green Party referred 
to Kurz during the 2017 election campaign as ‘the better Strache’.22
Fearmongering was the persuasive macro-strategy in the FPÖ’s and ÖVP’s election 
campaigns in 2017 (Wodak, 2018a). They wilfully selected specific scapegoats as being 
responsible for the misery or threat identified: ‘illegal migrants’, Muslims and Islam, 
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the previous coalition government, in which Kurz had served six years as minister 
for foreign affairs, and the integration of migrants. Both Strache and Kurz staged 
themselves as saviours of the ‘true Austrian people’ (see Figures 1 and 2), ready to 
‘solve’ the alleged problems by, for instance, closing borders and deporting ‘illegal 
migrants’. A new, positive narrative was created, which should raise hope, advertised 
as an unspecified change.
The stirring up of resentment by Kurz and Strache was successful at the election.23 
The national-conservative ÖVP won a majority with 31.5%. The FPÖ took third 
place with 26%.24 Due to the substantial overlap between the political programmes 
of the FPÖ and ÖVP, coalition talks began soon after. The new turquoise-blue 
government, albeit accompanied by loud protests, was inaugurated by President Van 
der Bellen on 18 December 2017.25 During negotiations to form this government, 
President Alexander van der Bellen (in office since 26 January 2017) successfully 
prevented the Ministries of the Interior and Justice going to FPÖ officials as part of 
the coalition deal and pushed for the EU agenda to be relocated from the FPÖ-led 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chancellery of Kurz. Despite all this, Van der Bellen 
did inaugurate the turquoise-blue coalition, notwithstanding frequent assurances to 
the contrary he had given while running for president.26
Moving towards ‘Orbánism’
The ÖVP’s adoption of a far-right, nationalist-conservative agenda implies the 
normalisation of a previously extreme-right, taboo agenda. It is thus not surprising 
that the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) published an editorial on 
6 July 2018 – after the beginning of Austria’s EU presidency on 1 July 2018 – with 
<insert Figure 2> Please supply original images if possible
<caption>Figure 2. Poster with Sebastian Kurz: ‘Now or never! ÖVP, Ballot Sebastian 




















































the headline ‘Austria: When good countries go bad’,27 thus clearly indicating the 
limits of EUrope with respect to the officially accepted values of the European Treaty:
Concerns centre on a set of inter-related issues: the Austrian Government’s 
stance on asylum and migration; its closeness to the demagogic leaders of 
certain countries; its underlying anti-EU stance; its courtship with Russia. 
The country’s ability to play the role of the Presidency is questioned because 
its obsessive and biased approach to migration and its love-in with the 
extremists may preclude the neutrality required. … while the threat from 
extremist-nationalists like the Freedom Party is clear …, the anti-migration, 
anti-Europe agenda becomes far more powerful through the conversion of 
mainstream leaders and parties to the cause, along with their subsequent 
complicity in allowing institutional and political capture by the migration 
obsession of the bad company they decide to keep.
In the following, I briefly point to some salient indicators for Austria’s move towards 
an illiberal democracy while focusing on the discursive and argumentative strategies 
accompanying new legislation.28
Fearmongering: Us and Them
The new Austrian government propagates an extremely restrictive immigration policy 
(Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018a) and closed borders (even to Italy and South Tyrol), 
including the so-called Mediterranean route. Shamelessly, both the FPÖ and the 
new ÖVP are actively spreading rumours, strawman fallacies and erroneous reports 
about migrants and refugees – which all merge into a single threat scenario consisting 
of an imagined ‘invasion’ by so-called ‘illegal migrants’ (Wodak, 2018b). To side-
step the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and prevent further loss of 
voters to the FPÖ, ÖVP politicians now define people who have been persecuted 
and are fleeing as ‘illegal migrants’ in their government programme.29 This implies 
that they are claiming to be refugees but are in fact travelling to rich European 
countries to live off welfare and benefits, and thereby endanger the prosperity of 
those countries. Such fallacies foment resentment and envy: why should foreigners 
gain access to benefits that take something away from ‘us’? Such exclusionary and 
xenophobic politics – sustained and implemented by the formerly Christian-social 
ÖVP – correspond to the welfare chauvinism of other far-right populists in Europe, 
such as the German Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Sweden Democrats or the 
Dutch PVV (Wodak, 2017, 2018a).
Euphemisms are used with the aim of making restrictive new migration policies 
acceptable: in a meeting of EU heads of state in Brussels on 28 June 2018, Kurz 
and his allies Orbán and Matteo Salvini (LEGA, Italy’s Interior Minister) launched 
new terms, such as ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ instead of ‘camps’, to retain 
refugees in Northern Africa, thus preventing them from entering Europe. Moreover, 
facts about the plights of refugees are challenged and expert opinions neglected. For 
example, on 22 June 2018, in an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit, editor-
in-chief Giovanni Di Lorenzo asked Sebastian Kurz what he felt when confronted 
with videos and pictures of children who had been separated from their parents at the 
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‘I don’t want to speculate, but I have devoted myself a lot to migration. I know that 
frequently the mistake is being made, that something is represented differently than 
it is.’31 As Hannah Arendt (1971) asserted long ago, politicians can quickly change 
facts into opinions that one can then oppose – quite shamelessly – with alternative 
viewpoints. In this way, she argues, scholarly and factual evidence can be blunted 
and even negated.
Antisemitism/racism/historical revisionism
As Hans-Hennig Scharsach (2017) argues in his book Stille Machtergreifung [Quiet 
Coup], the FPÖ’s internal structures have changed significantly since HC Strache took 
over as leader in 2005, moving the party ever closer to the radical right:32 members 
of duelling fraternities, which make up only 0.4% of the Austrian population, have 
effectively taken over the FPÖ. FPÖ politicians such as Strache, Norbert Hofer 
(Minister for Infrastructure), Johann Gudenus and Manfred Haimbuchner (vice-
governor of Upper Austria) constitute the highest leadership body of the FPÖ. They 
all belong to duelling fraternities (Schlagende Burschenschaften; Rauscher, 2017).33 Core 
characteristics of the extreme right, such as anti-liberalism, authoritarian leadership 
and subservience, a so-called Volksgemeinschaft (an ethno-culturally defined people), 
misogyny and racism apply to most duelling fraternities.
Immediately after the new government was formed on 18 December 2017, 
numerous scandals related to antisemitic and revisionist documents disrupted 
the everyday agenda of the government: this included Facebook posts as well as 
songbooks {not sure what you mean by this} typical of such extreme-right 
duelling fraternities.34 For example, the FPÖ’s Herbert Kickl, now Interior Minister, 
proposed ‘to concentrate people who enter asylum procedures in one place, because 
it must be our common interest to reach a corresponding result very, very quickly’.35
Obviously, the verb phrase ‘to concentrate people’ invites associations with the Nazi 
term ‘concentration camp’. The centre-left broadsheet Der Standard maintains and 
continuously updates a list of euphemistically labelled ‘singular events’ [Einzelfälle] 
of antisemitism and revisionism which have been occurring on an almost weekly 
basis and keep the FPÖ in the headlines.36 Conspiracy theories have become a salient 
strategy in this context. They draw on the traditional antisemitic world-conspiracy 
stereotype which also characterised Nazi and fascist ideologies (Richardson, 2018 
{Not in References – there is a 2017 Richardson publication listed}). For 
example, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán published a list of 200 so-called 
‘Soros mercenaries’37 (including scholars, journalists, intellectuals and NGOs, 
who allegedly supported the Jewish Hungarian-American philanthropist) who are 
trying to help refugees in Hungary. Indeed, Soros has been demonised via such 
traditional antisemitic conspiracy stereotypes as the primary Feindbild of Hungary 
and, subsequently, also of the FPÖ (Wodak, 2018b).38
Symbolic politics distract and divert from unpopular reforms implemented by the 
government and dominate the media. For example, Harald Waldhäusl, FPÖ councillor 
in Lower Austria, challenged the slaughtering of animals according to Jewish and 
Muslim rites, and proposed monitoring and registering orthodox Jews who bought 
such meat – as was to be expected, this provoked a media scandal and negative 
responses by the opposition and the Jewish community.39 Another highly emotional 




















































headscarf ’ as a symbol of female oppression (an example of the ‘right-wing populist 
perpetuum mobile’; see Wodak, 2015a). The government has proposed forbidding the 
headscarf in kindergarten40 – although nobody knows how many, if any, three-year-
old Muslim girls are forced to wear a headscarf in kindergarten. On 24 July 2018, an 
FPÖ village councillor was finally expelled from the party after he had labelled the 
French soccer team that had won the World Cup as ‘Congo-monkeys’ (Kongoaffen).41
Challenging press freedom
It is also part of the current government’s programme to ‘reform’ the media – which 
seems to be a euphemism for continuous and vicious attacks on established journalists 
and moderators. Figure 3 exemplifies such attacks by the FPÖ via social media, using 
the rhetorical strategy of ‘calculated ambivalence’. This strategy seeks to convey distinct 
messages to multiple audiences (the party’s extreme-right base and the public) while 
maintaining plausible deniability through ambiguity (Engel and Wodak, 2013). In this 
case, the meme posted by Strache (as Austrian Vice-Chancellor) was headed by the 
label ‘satire!’ and a smiling emoticon. Showing the well-known and internationally 
renowned journalist and moderator of the main news show of the Austrian public 
broadcaster ORF in the background to the right, the text reads ‘There is a place where 
lies become news. That is the ORF. The best of Fake News, lies and propaganda, 
pseudo-culture and involuntary fees. Regional and international. On television, radio 
and the Facebook profile of Armin Wolf.’
Both Armin Wolf and the ORF have sued Strache for libel and won. Strache had to 
apologise publicly and pay €10,000 to Armin Wolf, who donated this money to the 
Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes (DÖW), an NGO that documents 
neo-Nazi and extreme-right activities. Meanwhile, the FPÖ has continued to publicly 
campaign for the downsizing or privatisation of the ORF, while backchannel pressure 
on editors and journalists has been increased.42
<insert Figure 3 here>
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Kurz and his government have also implemented a strategy of ‘information 
management’.43 Each week, a specific topic is launched in a press conference and is 
then elaborated for one week, until being replaced with a new agenda seven days 
later. In this way, the media are kept busy and simultaneously distracted from other 
relevant news. Moreover, access to information is being severely restricted: government 
employees have been forbidden to speak with the press. Such rules come close to 
‘managed democracies’ and their press policies, as defined earlier.
Conclusions: ‘shameless normalisation’ – paving the way to 
illiberalism
Investigative journalist Florian Klenk aptly illustrates the strategies of distraction and 
silence employed by the coalition government when challenging the Austrian post-
war liberal consensus and its open society.44 For example, the Austrian government 
has pushed a new law through parliament (without the conventionally agreed-upon 
period for seeking expert opinions) which raises maximum daily working hours from 
8 to 12 and maximum weekly working hours from 40 to 60. They have sought to 
legitimise this by appeals to ‘flexibility’ – a neoliberal notion – thus destroying an 
extremely important pillar of Austria’s post-war democracy and guaranteed workers’ 
rights. Raising the number of hours has predictably angered the electorate of the FPÖ. 
A first huge demonstration organised by the trade unions against this law took place 
on 30 June 2018. Specific populist measures such as the retraction of the anti-smoking 
law, which would have taken effect on 1 May 2018 – a concession the ÖVP made to 
the FPÖ despite the abundance of scientific evidence for the raised mortality caused 
by cigarettes – have not sufficiently appeased the FPÖ’s core electorate.45 One could 
thus speculate that the government has strategically decided to please its electorate 
with ever-more restrictive migration policies, even though the numbers of migrants 
and refugees have fallen drastically.
Interestingly, Chancellor Kurz usually remains silent when the FPÖ crosses 
a so-called ‘red line’, ignoring multiple requests for interviews or comment on 
false claims about ‘illegal migration’, revisionist or racist and antisemitic incidents, 
potential violations of human rights or attempted dismantling of the social welfare 
state. Moreover, the government does not take parliamentary enquiries posed by the 
opposition seriously, answering in vague and ambiguous terms. This blatant disregard 
forced even Wolfgang Sobotka, the ÖVP-nominated President of the Parliament, 
to reprimand Kurz and his ministers for not adequately fulfilling their parliamentary 
duties.46
As already observed by Uitz (2015) regarding Orbán’s Hungary, dialogue with 
experts, the opposition and journalists also seems to be out of the question in Kurz’ 
Austria; consultations with the trade unions, NGOs and other important organisations 
are not granted; rational discussion is mostly substituted by symbolic politics, 
impoliteness, eristic argumentation or denial. Legislation that is not sufficiently well 
worded is pushed through parliament; scientific empirical evidence is frequently 
neglected or ridiculed. It seems as if the ÖVP in its streamlined, strategically planned 
trajectory to power in the sense of leading the new government has either ignored or 
quietly accepted the kind of non-democratic ideologues they have aligned themselves 




















































Most of the breaches of constitutional order, such as freedom of opinion, freedom 
of assembly, freedom of press and the independence of the legal system in illiberal 
democracies (Poland and Hungary) are not announced explicitly; they are made in 
small – seemingly unimportant – steps like the intervention into the Supreme Court 
in Poland, where replacing irremovable judges was implemented through a small, 
banal paragraph about the retirement age of judges, although the Constitution sets a 
fixed term for supreme court judges.47 In this case, some of the supreme court judges 
resisted, and thus this incident made international headlines.48 As Grabbe and Lehne 
(2017b: 3) argue, these changes imply ‘mind-closing narratives’ which are obviously 
‘gaining force as formerly liberal politicians run after populists’.
Such a dynamic corresponds to – what I have labelled elsewhere – ‘shameless 
normalisation’ (Wodak, 2018a), to be observed not only in the Central and Eastern 
European countries but also in Austria, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands. The non-
compliance with EUropean values and the yearning for exceptionalism vehemently 
challenge the European project; the rejection of all dialogue, agreed norms and 
established conventions seems to render negotiations impossible and to pave the way 
for illiberalism and neo-authoritarianism. New narratives, new public spaces, new 
communication modes and – most importantly – new policies are urgently needed 
to protect the achievements of enlightenment and pluralistic liberal democracies.
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2  Voters in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Hungary and the 
UK were interviewed: countries from the East, West and South – but none of the 
Scandinavian countries.
3  78% of AfD voters, 76% of FN {Front National?} voters, 69% of FPÖ voters, 66% 
of LEGA Nord voters, 57% of PVV voters, 58% of PiS voters, 61% of Fidesz, 50% of 
Jobbik voters and 50% of UKIP voters fear migration more than war, poverty, financial 





7  For more information, see the so-called Tavares Report {link? Or is it Nergelius 
or Closa?} and the role of the Venice Commission (Nergelius, 2015: 291–294; Closa 
et al, 2014: 19).
8  See https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/13/the-geert-wilders-effect/
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10  For the Hungarian case, see www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/world/europe/hungary-
election-orban-fidesz.html
11  Gasiorowski (2006: 110–11) mentions the distinction between personalistic authoritarian 
regimes characterised by arbitrary rule and authority exercised ‘mainly through patronage 
networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules’ (such as in 
post-colonial Africa) and populist authoritarian regimes defined as ‘mobilizational regimes 
in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving 
key lower-class groups’ (for example, Argentina under Peron, Venezuela under Chavez 
and Maduro).
12  Krastev (2006), however, prefers the label of ‘managed democracy’ for 21st century 
Russia (and challenges Zakaria’s approach to illiberal democracies; see for example 
Nisnevich and Ryabov 2002 {Not in References – there is a 2017 publication 
listed} for details on developments in Russia since 1989). A managed democracy, 
Krastev argues, functions like an autocracy; thus, governments are legitimised by 
elections that, however, do not impact on the state’s policies and agenda.
13  See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:88f94461-564b-4b75-aef7-
c957de8e339d.0006.01/DOC_1&format=PDF
14  Among the vast literature on the FPÖ, see Forchtner et al (2013), Wodak (2015a, 
2015b, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c), Scharsach (2017), Wodak and Pelinka (2002), 
Ötsch and Horaczek (2017), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Ottomeyer (2000), and 
Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2009).
15  See Rheindorf and Wodak (2018b) for the history of the FPÖ after 1945.
16  Backstage, nativist, racist, misogynistic and antisemitic ideologies remained explicit 
(Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018b).
17  See the third part of the ÖVP’s election programme on order and security: secure.
sebastian-kurz.at/ordnung-und-sicherheit/&usg=ALkJrhin9CszbrB0sNM3hlNFAop
pXPMGqwRegierungsprogramm {this URL doesn’t work – please provide an 
alternative}
18  The ÖVP is the successor party to the Christian-Social Party, a staunchly conservative 
and antisemitic movement founded in 1893 by the then mayor of Vienna, Karl 
Lueger, a highly controversial right-wing populist. Between the two World Wars, 
most of the members of the Austrian People’s party also belonged to the Vaterländische 
Front under its leader Engelbert Dollfuß, who was assassinated by members of the 
then illegal National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) in 1934. While still 
sometimes honoured by ÖVP members for resisting Hitler, the regime of Dollfuß 




20  Part of the ‘Austrian success story’ after 1945 is the establishment of the Austrian 
Sozialpartnerschaft. The most important employer and employee organisations 
work together and with the government, finding acceptable compromises for 
economic issues, salary negotiations and so forth (www.polipedia.at/tiki-index.
php?page=Sozialpartnerschaft). In this way, Austria experienced few strikes and social 
conflicts in the post-war period.
21  See https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/293189/umfrage/asylantraege-in-
oesterreich/





















































23  It is not possible to describe the election campaigns here, beset as they were by many 
(media) scandals, rumours and partly criminal machinations. Rather, the aim here is 
to trace the change of hegemonic discourse and accepted practices due to a ‘successful’ 
adoption of populist extreme-right propositions and rhetoric.
24  See www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/oesterreich-alle-ergebnisse-der-nationalratswahl-
2017-a-1172061.html




26  See www.bundespraesident.at/aufgaben/aufgaben-und-rechte/ {this URL doesn’t 
work – please provide an alternative} On Van der Bellen’s premature assertions 




28  I unfortunately must neglect the manifold, complex reasons for such a global move 
to the right, such as rising economic inequality, the financial crisis of 2008, austerity 
politics, identity politics and so forth, which are covered extensively elsewhere (Wodak, 
2015a, 2017, 2018b; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Fuchs, 2018).
29  See https://kurier.at/politik/regierungsprogramm-rigorose-massnahmen-gegen-
asylmissbrauch/302.354.984
30  www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2018-06/wien-sebastian-kurz-giovanni-di-lorenzo-live
31  In the original German: Ich will da jetzt nicht mutmaßen, aber ich habe mich sehr viel mit 
Migration beschäftigt. Ich weiß, dass oft sehr schnell der Fehler gemacht wird, dass etwas anders 
dargestellt wird, als es ist.
32  See Pfahl-Traughber (2015: 75–81) on the differences between right-wing, left-wing 
and religious extremism.
33  On the history of the FPÖ, see Rheindorf and Wodak (2018b) as well as Wodak and 
Rheindorf (2018).







38  These antisemitic slurs seem to contradict the many explicit affirmations of friendship 
with the Israeli government and Prime Minister Netanyahu. That many populist 
extreme-right parties seek to befriend and support the Israeli government, however, 
indicates a coalition based on similar interests and exclusionary politics – of fighting 
the left-wing opposition, on the one hand, and the alleged Muslim threat, on the 



































































47  I am very grateful to Jan Grzymski for pointing me to this case, as it provides more 
evidence for my overall argument.
48  https://orf.at/stories/2328900/2328903/
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